The Netherlands and Islam

Show preview

Hide preview

ISIMI S I M N E W S L E T T E R 9 / 0 2 7 L e c t u r e
P E T E R V AN D E R VE E R
In the Netherlands and in other Western countries one finds a hostile image of Islam. Only recently we saw this image influencing the panicky reactions to the terrorist attacks on the USA by Arab Muslims. With great speed this attack was connected to state- ments of a general nature on the essence of Islam and of Muslims. Dutch politicians and Islam scholars spoke in public about the age-old frustration of Mus- lims that was presumed to be the background of this attack. Almost immediately the question of the loyal- ty of Muslim immigrants to the Dutch state and to Dutch norms and values emerged in public debate. Opinion polls showed quickly how fickle that loyalty is and how methodologically shaky opinion polls are. This was followed by attacks on mosques and Islamic schools. The urgency of a more sophisticated analy- sis of the relationship between the Netherlands and Islam is self-evident.
The general view is that Islam in the Nether- lands is a very recent phenomenon. That is
certainly true if one only looks at the Netherlands on the North Sea and at the im- migrants from Turkey and Morocco. Howev-
er, if one takes a historically and geographi- cally more extended perspective, the Dutch
state, like other European states such as England and France, can be seen to have been dealing with Muslim subjects already
for a long period of time. I am referring to the overseas colonies, Indonesia and Suri- nam, whose decolonization is as much part
of the emergence of a postcolonial world as the new forms of labour migration to West- ern Europe and to other regions in the
world. A nationalist perspective in which the Netherlands on the North Sea forms the frame for the understanding of social cohe-
sion in a multicultural society can never pro- vide an understanding of processes of glob- alization, the rise of the network-society, or
the North-South problematic, which are es- sential to the problems that the Nether-
lands is facing. The simple fact that only now does the Dutch government acknowl- edge that the Netherlands has become an
immigration country demonstrates the long-term nationalist denial of global processes. In the English literature on multi-
cultural society is what I state here, ex- pressed in the slogan 'The Empire strikes back'. In the case of England and France this
seems more evident, since many immi- grants come from former colonies, but in fact this is part of the same historical transi-
tion. In short: West European states have colonized peoples and territories overseas and have modernized themselves and their
colonies, a process resulting in a world-sys-
tem of independent nation-states. In the final stages of this process a reversed migra- tion from the South to the North has
emerged in which, in principle, indepen- dent nation-states attempt to control the
flow of people. The Netherlands is at present a postcolo-
nial society, an immigration country with a
relatively large number of immigrants whose religion is Islam. Not so long ago the Netherlands was a colonial society in which
a majority of the population was Muslim. In my view the 'question of Islam' in the colonies can, in a number of aspects, fruit-
fully be compared with the current prob- lematic of the integration of Muslims in the Netherlands. The present postcolonial gov-
ernment, as did the colonial government, tries to make Muslims into modern citizens,
but it is hard to combine this policy with the principle of the separation of church and s t a t e .
The colonial state According to influential, liberal policy
makers in the early 20t h century, such as Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, the task of the colonial state is to make Islam into a modern
religion. This means secularization, that is to say a separation of church and state and, furthermore, an opposition to militant
Islam. It does not mean that the govern- ment should interfere with the religious character of Islam. In the liberal view the
principle of freedom of religion is to be maintained. Freedom of religion, however,
does not imply cultural relativism. It is seen as the task of the colonial government to ef- fect a change in the backwardness of Mus-
lims, but the government should do so slowly and prudently. On the other hand, however, the state has to repress the mix-
ture of religion and politics in Islam, be- cause it obstructs progress.
In short, Indonesians were allowed to be
Muslim, but should not organize themselves on the basis of Islam. Education was seen as the instrument for modernizing Muslim so-
ciety. Muslims had to be educated in Dutch (secularized) culture in order to get past the political and social significance of religious
difference. It is interesting that these policy
views were articulated in a period in which the political organization of the metropolis was still largely based on religious differ-
ence. In the Indies, however, subjects still had to be educated to become citizens.
We know now that the secularization of the Indies has not been successful. Islamic
organizations are crucial in the political con- stellation of postcolonial Indonesia. As in many societies it is the army that tries to
control these organizations and sometimes this is successful for a period, as in Suharto's New Order. These Islamic organizations do
not want to connect politics and religion in a medieval fashion, but want to formulate a modern Islam. They do not aim at the estab-
lishment of an original k h a l i f a t, but are in- spired by modern ideas about democracy
and nationalism. As in Tocqueville's descrip- tion of Christian organizations as the basis of democratic America, in Indonesia too Is-
lamic organizations can constitute the basis for a democratic nation-state. In Western so- cieties such as the Netherlands and Eng-
land, religious organization has been foun- dational in the formation of the nation- state. In contrast to the views of liberal
thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Snouck Hurgronje, there is no inherent opposition between religion and democratic freedom.
In fact religious mass movements such as the 19t h-century anti-slavery movement have played a significant role in the creation
of public opinion and a public sphere. The colonial notion that the state has to repress
the combination of religion and politics in Islam emerges in fact from the desire to con- trol society without being legitimated by
the population. In the liberal view religion has to be transferred from the public do- main to the private domain, but the state is
not willing to leave the private domain alone. In postcolonial societies such as In- donesia there is a struggle between central-
izing state institutions and more localized Islamic organizations to control daily life. Education is the focus of that struggle. In
the end the struggle is about conflicting perspectives on civilization and political participation. Such perspectives are not sta-
tic and cannot be summarized in easy di- chotomies. The Indonesian case shows
clearly that religious organizations can play an important role in the furthering of politi- cal participation of citizens. There is no in-
herent opposition between Islam and democracy. The concept of democracy, however, is far from simple and has to be
understood in a comparative-historical man- ner. In Indonesia one finds a growing politi- cal participation, while in the West one finds
a declining participation. Should we now in- troduce formal, quantifiable criteria to es- tablish whether Indonesia becomes more
democratic and the Netherlands less? It is more fruitful to analyse changing power
configurations less ideologically and to at- tempt an interpretation of the effects of growing or declining participation of citi-
zens on regional and global political process- e s .
Dilemmas of modern states In my view modern states, colonial and
postcolonial, share a number of fundamen-
tal objectives. The historical analysis of the colonial period provides some insight into
the dilemmas of modern states. In the first
place modern states have to make individu- als national citizens. That is to say that edu- cated subjects have to be made loyal to the
nation-state. Secondly, the state derives its legitimacy from a process of political partic-
ipation of citizens. A public sphere in which social movements and voluntary organiza- tions operate is essential to that purpose.
Thirdly, the modern state needs to protect the liberty and equality of all citizens. At least this is the enlightened ideal, however
much historical reality may differ from it. The first element then is that of citizen-
ship and loyalty to the nation-state. From
the Reformation there has been a problem concerning the political loyalty of religious groups that did not belong to the state
church. This problem is for a large part solved in the modern nation-state, in which
national identity and not religious identity is the basis of political loyalty. Secularization theories have assumed that this would also
imply the privatization of religion, but that is not true. Religion remained significant as a foundation for social and political organi-
zation. In the Dutch case of 'pillarization' we find a pacification of religious and ideologi- cal oppositions, but also a model for partici-
pation in a plural society. The first social sci- ence theory of plural society, formulated by Furnivall, is based on Indonesia, and indeed
the postcolonial p a n c a s i l a concept has been inspired by Dutch pillarization. The idea is that religious identity is the channel
through which one arrives at national iden- tity and the two remain connected. The
colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that this kind of religious mobiliza- tion might bring an end to colonial domina-
tion. In contemporary Dutch society, Mus- lim citizens are in more ways than one still connected to their countries of origin.
Moreover, their religious identity is (not yet) connected to Dutch national identity. Their connection with Mecca can perhaps be
compared to the earlier anti-national loyalty to Rome of Dutch Catholics that was as- sumed by anti-papist groups – with the dif-
ference that religious identity is now but- tressed by ethnic identity. The state at- tempts to use education to integrate Mus-
lims in Dutch society, but one must realize that the possibilities of the state to national-
ize citizens have declined. In other words, homogeneity cannot be reached as easily as in the 1950s. Like Indonesia, the Nether-
lands is a plural society in which individual- ism and group identities make national identity of only relative importance. This is a
process that seems inescapable. It has been analysed as the emergence of the network- society or the post–national state. If net-
works that are based on group mobilization are indeed becoming more important this would mean a bright future for religions like
Islam. The little-centralized Islamic forms of organization with their shifting sites and
sources of authority are pre-eminently suit- ed for such a society.
The second important element in the de-
velopment of modern society is political participation. On the basis of race, sex, and class the modern state has long excluded
subjects from the democratic process. Slow- ly general suffrage has emerged, although an age criteria has been maintained. The
most important justification for excluding
The Netherlands and Islam
image not available online
Continued on page 8
Repairs at the Abibakr School in N i j m e g e n following arson.
This article is an
adapted version of
Professor Van der
Veer's lecture at
t h e occasion of the
D r Hendrik Müller
Award, which he
received on 8 October
2001 from the Royal
Dutch Academy of
Sciences for his
contribution to the
social science study
o f religion. The Müller
Award is the most
important prize for
social science
research in the
N e t h e r l a n d s .

ISIM8 I S I M N E W S L E T T E R 9 / 0 2
the colonized peoples from the political process can be found in John Stuart Mill's
and Snouck Hurgronje's idea that these peoples should be considered as 'children'. This 19t h-century liberal notion remained in
force until nationalist movements put an end to colonial domination. The Indies were governed through indirect rule. The elite
was identified and used as brokers between government and society. The colonial soci- ety was prevented from self-organization.
This procedure resembles the way in which the postcolonial government tries to find brokers in its dealings with ethnic and reli-
gious minorities. As such one can under- stand the sometimes comical discussion
about imams in the Netherlands. The gov- ernment feels a strong need to speak to Muslims via their leaders. The problem is
that these hardly exist, since imams are often poorly educated prayer leaders who have some influence, but one that is not to
be over-estimated. Some universities in the Netherlands that have little-attended theo- logical seminaries have proposed that they
could give these imams a thorough theo- logical and pastoral education. This is a per- fect example of indirect rule, according to
which groups do not organize themselves but are represented by leaders created by
the government. The latter not only creates leaders, but also forces people to make use of ethnic and religious channels to voice
their views vis-à-vis the government. The problem here is that one wants to have peo- ple participate in the political process in
ways they have not chosen. At present polit- ical participation in the Netherlands and in other Western countries has declined con-
siderably and it is not to be expected that newcomers expend much energy in this do- main. It is more likely that people will be
mobilized around certain issues, such as the environment, traffic and spatial mobility, and education; and that also religious issues
will be introduced. When there is a public debate about, for example, headscarves in
schools, people are mobilized around the issue and their religious organizations are
happy to step in. In this way, Muslims follow the pattern of involvement of their non- Muslim co-citizens.
The neutral state The last element is that of freedom and
equality as the ideals of the modern nation- state. An important element here is the sep- aration of church and state. Neutrality of the
state in matters of religious choice has to be guaranteed as a political principle, although one has to observe that there are vast differ-
ences between the USA, the Netherlands, France, Turkey, India, Indonesia and other
modern nation-states in the implementa- tion of this principle. The US was the first state in which the separation of church and
state was rigorously applied with the para- doxical effect that public religion is of great political importance there. In the Nether-
lands there is, among others, the Free Uni- versity (which is Protestant) and the Catholic University of Nijmegen, both of
which count few Protestant or Catholic stu- dents, but nonetheless have religious foun- dations and full government financing. An
old problem is the definition of freedom and the fact that procedures of freedom can
be used to promote un-freedom. Everyone will be convinced of the liberating effects of modern science. The biological theory of
evolution is science and creationism is a be- lief. In the USA religious activists try to intro- duce creationism in the curriculum of public
schools, because they are of the opinion that evolutionism and creationism are equal sets of belief. The polemic between these
positions exists already since the famous debate between the scientist Thomas Hux- ley and the Anglican Bishop Wilberforce in
Oxford in 1860. The term 'fundamentalism' originates from the important Scopes trial in the US in 1925 where the bible was pitched,
as it were, against Darwin. The problem of the modern state is that good education,
based on scientific knowledge and a partic- ular form of rationality, is essential to its de-
velopment, and that the government has to be neutral towards religious opinions in so- ciety. The introduction of Hindu, Muslim,
and Christian curricula is thus only accept- able when they do not conflict with scientif- ic knowledge. For such conflict-ridden de-
bates there are no simple solutions and, again, people can be mobilized around is- sues, such as creationism.
Network society Thus far I have emphasized the role of the
nation-state, but can the postcolonial state still be called a national state in the present
era? In social science debates about global- ization it is sometimes argued that the 19t h- century nation-state is on its way out and is
succeeded by global actors, such as the UN and the World Bank. Such a position goes too far in my opinion, but what we do see is
a transformation of the national state and the rise of what the sociologist Manuel Castells has called 'the Network Society'. In
his argument emphasis is given to the de- clining capacity of the state to satisfy the demands and requirements of citizens, but
he forgets that this capacity has only been available to the welfare states of the West.
In most other regions of the world welfare has never existed. The decolonized areas that Clifford Geertz in the 1960s called 'new
states in old societies' have never seen an effective battle against poverty and illitera- cy. In those areas one finds a general disillu-
sionment with respect to the powers that be, which have promised so much and de- livered so little. What seems to connect the
entire world, from the US to India, is the no- tion that the state does not offer the solu- tion for problems but is itself the problem.
Migrants try to avoid the state in building transnational networks. This is obviously true for large-scale illegal migration, but it is
also true for legal migration. An important indication is the fact that money transfers of
transnational migrants in 1995 were esti- mated to exceed 70 billion dollars according
to the IMF. National governments try to con- trol these transfers, but are not capable of doing so. It is important to see that this kind
of large-scale monetary traffic enables transnational entrepreneurship. Integration in a nation-state is not the aim of these en-
trepreneurs, although they may well be citi- zens of the states of immigration. They want to be flexible, to be able to respond quickly
to changes in political and financial circum- stances. They constitute transnational net- works with junctions in a number of nation-
s t a t e s . In cultural and religious aspects these net-
works are supported by transnational movements, such as the Pentecostals in Christianity, the World Council of Hindus in
the case of Hinduism and the many mission- ary movements in the case of Islam. These movements are crucial in the creation of
transnational identities that connect to the universal message of these religions. While most of them are quietist and expect salva-
tion from the ultimate conversion of all the citizens of the world to the universal Truth, there are also extremist and violent move-
ments among them that aim at more direct political goals. Already in the colonial peri-
od these movements were feared by the Western governments. Especially the so- called pan-Islamism was closely watched.
For instance, Snouck Hurgronje's stay in Mecca was subsidized by the Ministry for the Colonies since it wanted to have infor-
mation on the Indonesians who were living in Jeddah and Mecca. With the rise of inde- pendent states in Africa and Asia the politi-
cal mobilization of Muslims seemed to be channelled into nationalist movements and focused on the national arena. In that way
the danger of pan-Islamism seemed to have disappeared, but if we ever harboured such an illusion, it will have dissipated after the
events of 11 September in the US. That this was indeed an illusion should not surprise
us since local, regional, and national con- flicts constantly have international and transnational effects. Not only nation-states
are crucial in military conflicts but also transnational networks of militant groups. This was true for the Comintern and it is also
true for the pan-Islamist groups which have been fighting in several conflicts in Bosnia, Egypt, Afghanistan or the Moluccas. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union – partly by their own doing – they are constantly con- fronted with the US and its allies. When one
takes into account the role of the US and the West in supporting the repressive regime of Israel, some anti-Western and anti-Ameri-
can feelings might be expected. The terror- ist attack has suddenly made us much more
aware of the negative effects of postcolonial globalization on the Western world. One can no longer assume that conflicts in the
South, in which the North, particularly the US, is involved will be contained there. Moreover, with the rise of the network-soci-
ety the possibilities of states to guarantee security within territorial borders have de- clined. Responses to this situation cannot
be limited to conventional military and po- litical options, but have to emerge from clear-minded analyses of the transforma-
tion of the national state. To transnational challenges one has to give transnational an-
swers. The demonizing of Muslim immi- grants who are perceived as symbols of the large-scale upheavals of today's world is the
opposite of such an answer. It brings us back to old nationalist reflexes that want to bring back that which has already disap-
peared: the homogenous nation-state.
Peter van der Veer is director of the Research Center
Religion and Society (University of Amsterdam) and co-
director of the ISIM.
Lifecycle rituals o f Muslims in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s Nathal Dessing, ISIM Educational Coordi- nator, defended her Ph.D. dissertation entitled Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Mar-
riage, and Death among Muslims in the N e t h e r l a n d s at Leiden University on 1 9 September 2001. In her dissertation,
now published by Uitgeverij Peeters, Dessing examines the effects of migra- tion on the lifecycle rituals of Moroccan,
Turkish, and Surinamese Muslims in the Netherlands. She explores how Islamic rituals marking birth, circumcision, mar-
riage, and death have responded and ac- commodated to the Dutch legal and so-
cial context. After setting out the relevant Islamic prescriptions, Dessing draws on her fieldwork in Rotterdam, The Hague,
and Utrecht to chart how each ritual has evolved through migration, and com- pares the ritual practice in the Nether-
lands and the countries of origin. Dessing thereby sheds light on the meaning, ex- perience, and organization of lifecycle rit-
uals in the migration setting.
Nathal M. Dessing, Rituals of Birth, Circumcision,
Marriage, and Death among Muslims in the
Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001).
ISBN 90-429-1059-3
P U B L I C A T I O N
Call for Applications AKMI Post- D o c t o r a l F e l l o w s h i p s For the 2002–2003 academic year, the Working Group Modernity and Islam (AKMI) of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin invites applications for three post-doctoral fellowships
for the project entitled ‘Jewish and Islamic Hermeneutics as Cultural Critique’. Directed by Almut Sh. Bruckstein (Freie Universität Berlin/Hebrew University Jerusalem) and Navid
Kermani (Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin), the project intends t o develop formats for the comparative hermeneutics of
Muslim and Jewish traditions. Addressed are phenomena a n d practices in which the script comes alive, such as the recitation of the word, oral and musical traditions, the
aesthetics and iconography of texts, and the genres and structures of traditional exegesis.
For further information please consult:
h t t p : / / w w w . w i k o - b e r l i n . d e / I n f o r m a t i o n / e a k m i _ i . h t m
A N N O U N C E M E N T
Continued from front page 7: The Netherlands and Islam / by Peter van der Veer