Type

Database

Creator

Date

Thumbnail

Search results

342 records were found.

This article reports on the results from a spatiotemporal analysis of disaggregate fire incident data. The innovative analysis presented here focuses on the exploration of spatial and temporal patterns for four principal fire incident categories: property, vehicle, secondary fires, and malicious false alarms. This research extends previous work on spatial exploration of spatiotemporal patterns by demonstrating the benefits of comaps and kernel density estimation in examining temporal and spatiotemporal dynamics in calls for services. Results indicate that fire incidents are not static in either time or space and that spatiotemporal variation is related to incident type. The application of these techniques has the potential to inform policy decisions both from a reactive, resource-allocation perspective and from a more proactive p...
Does exposure to international trade have a pro-competitive effect on domestic pricing? This paper attends to this question in two stages: first, by developing a simple methodology to test the above proposition by linking domestic pricing behaviour to external competition via a simple mark-up technology; next, disaggregated Indian manufacturing data is used to show that the sector is imperfectly competitive and that both price and quantity competition from abroad over the last twenty years has had a dampening effect on domestic pricing behaviour.
Comment: 13 pages, Latex format, some minor corrections are made, accepted for publication in Physical Review D
Comment: Revtex style, 11 pages, major rivisions done, appendix added, title changed
The two main questions in coalition games are 1) what coalitions should form and 2) how to distribute the value of each coalition between its members. When a game is not superadditive, other coalition structures (CSs) may be more attractive than the grand coalition. For example, if the agents care about the total payoff generated by the entire society, CSs that maximize utilitarian social welfare are of interest. The search for such optimal CSs has been a very active area of research. Stability concepts have been defined for games with coalition structure, under the assumption that the agents agree first on a CS, and then the members of each coalition decide on how to share the value of their coalition. An agent can refer to the values of coalitions with agents outside of its current coalition to argue for a larger share of the coaliti...
We consider the case of self-interested agents that are willing to form coalitions for increasing their individual rewards. We assume that each agent knows its individual payoff when a coalition structure (CS) is formed. We consider a CS to be stable if no individual agent has an incentive to change coalition from this CS. When no stable CSs exist, rational agents will be changing coalitions forever. When stable CSs exist, they may not be unique, and choosing one over the other may give an unfair advantage to some agents. In addition, it may not be possible to reach a stable CS from any CS using a sequence of myopic rational actions. We propose a payoff distribution scheme that is based on the expected utility of a rational myopic agent (an agent that changes coalitions to maximize immediate reward) given a probability distribution ove...
We consider the case of self-interested agents that are willing to form coalitions for increasing their individual rewards. We assume that each agent gets an individual payoff which depends on the coalition structure (CS) formed. We consider a CS to be stable if no individual agent has an incentive to change coalition from this CS. Stability is a desirable property of a CS: if agents form a stable CS, they do not spend further time and effort in selecting or changing CSs. When no stable CSs exist, rational agents will be changing coalitions forever unless some agents accept suboptimal results. When stable CSs exist, they may not be unique, and choosing one over the other will give an unfair advantage to some agents. In addition, it may not be possible to reach a stable CS from any CS using a sequence of myopic rational actions. We prov...
Want to know more?If you want to know more about this cutting edge product, or schedule a demonstration on your own organisation, please feel free to contact us or read the available documentation at http://www.keep.pt/produtos/retrievo/?lang=en