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ELIE; Income Redistribution; Optimal Taxation; Incentive Compatibility.
Redistribution; Incentive Compatibility; Optimal Income Taxation.
This article contributes to the debate about the reform of the French local business tax. It casts light on an argument in favour of its replacement by a tax based on the value added, an argument that was apparently overlooked. For this purpose, it uses the user cost of the production factors, and in particular the user cost of capital. Taking account of the other taxes paid by French firms, we show that the proposed change is accompanied by a significant drop in the user cost of capital and a limited increase in the costs of labor and use of land.
optimal income tax, top-income earners, migration, incentive constraints, participation constraints
deadweight loss, taxable income, nonlinear budget constraint
What is the impact of the threat of migration for tax purposes on the optimum redistributive policy of a country which aims at preventing emigration of highly skilled individuals ? We use the theory of optimum income taxation à la Mirrlees [1971] to answer this question. The world consists of two countries, a redistributive country A and a laissez-faire country B. The agents living in A emigrate to B if they obtain in the latter a greater utility level, taking migration costs into account. We assume that there is no income-effect on labour supply. After having extended Diamond?s [1998] formula, we present simulation results concerning the optimal income tax schedule in France when agents vote with their feet. The optimum allocation is characterised by a curse of the middle-skilled workers and an upper bound on the average tax rate whic...
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